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1 Introduction
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) is one of the cornerstones of financial eco-
nomics (Fama 1965). Its implication is that there should not be any exploitable profit
opportunities in financial markets. However, the empirical literature has documented
the presence of a number of so-called “market anomalies”, i.e. price behaviour that
appears to create abnormal profit opportunities.
One of the most famous stock market anomalies is the so-called overreaction
hypothesis detected by De Bondt and Thaler (1985), who showed that investors tend to
give excessive weight to recent relative to past information when making their portfo-
lio choices. A special case of the overreaction hypothesis is short-term price reactions
after one-day abnormal price changes. Empirical studies on various financial markets
show that after such price changes there are bigger contrarian price movements than
after normal (typical) daily fluctuations (Atkins and Dyl 1990; Bremer and Sweeney
1991; Bremer et al. 1997; Cox and Peterson 1994; Choi and Jayaraman 2009; etc).
This paper provides new evidence on the overreaction anomaly by analysing both
price counter-movements and movements in the direction of the overreaction and
comparing them to those after normal days. First, we carry out t tests to establish
whether the data generation process of prices is the same after days of overreaction and
typical days. We show that short-term overreactions cause the emergence of patterns
in price behaviour, i.e. temporary market inefficiencies that could result in extra profit
opportunities. Then we use a trading robot method to examine whether or not trading
strategies based on the detected statistical anomalies are profitable, i.e. whether price
overreactions are simply statistical phenomena or can also be seen as evidence against
the EMH. The analysis is carried out for various financialmarkets: theUS stockmarket
(the Dow Jones index and two companies included in this index), FOREX (EURUSD,
USDJPY, GBPCHF, AUDUSD) and commodity markets (Gold, Oil).
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the
existing literature on the overreaction hypothesis. Section 3 outlines the methodology
followed in this study. Section 4 discusses the empirical results. Section 5 offers some
concluding remarks.
2 Literature Review
There is a vast empirical literature on the EMH. Kothari and Warner (2006) reviewed
over 500 studies providing evidence in support of this paradigm. However, as pointed
out by Ball (2009), there is also plenty of evidence suggesting the presence of market
anomalies apparently inconsistent with EMH such as over- and under-reactions to
information flows, volatility explosions and seasonal yield bursts, yield dependence on
different variables such as market capitalisation, dividend rate, andmarket factors, etc.
Over- or under-reactions are significant deviations of asset prices from their average
values during certain periods of time (Stefanescu et al. 2012).
The overreaction hypothesis was first considered by De Bondt and Thaler (DT
1985), following the work of Kahneman and Tversky (1982), who had shown that
investors overvalue recent relative to past information. The main conclusions of DT
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were that the best (worst) performing portfolios in the NYSE over a three-year period
tended to under (over)-perform over the following three-year period. Overreactions
are associated with irrational behaviour of investors who overreact to news arrivals.
This leads to significant deviations of asset prices from their fundamental value. Such
overreactions normally lead to price corrections. An interesting fact, mentioned byDT,
is an asymmetry in the overreaction: its size is bigger for undervalued than for over-
valued stocks. DT also reported the existence of a “January effect”, i.e. overreactions
tend to occur mostly in that month.
Subsequent studies on the overreaction hypothesis include Brown et al. (1988), who
analysed NYSE data for the period 1946–1983 and reached similar conclusions to DT;
Zarowin (1989), who showed the presence of short-term market overreactions; Atkins
and Dyl (1990), who found overreactions in the NYSE after significant price changes
in one trading day, especially in the case of falling prices; Ferri and Min (1996), who
confirmed the presence of overreactions using S&P500 data for the period 1962–1991;
Larson and Madura (2003), who used NYSE data for the period 1988–1998 and also
showed the presence of overreactions, as did Clements et al. (2009).
Overreactions have also been found in other stockmarkets, including Spain (Alonso
and Rubio 1990), Canada (Kryzanowski and Zhang 1992), Australia (Brailsford 1992;
Clare and Thomas 1995), Japan (Chang et al. 1995), Hong-Kong (Akhigbe et al. 1998),
Brazil (DaCosta 1994; Richards 1997), New Zealand (Bowman and Iverson 1998),
China (Wang et al. 2004), Greek (Antoniou et al. 2005), Turkey (Vardar and Okan
2008) and Ukraine (Mynhardt and Plastun 2013). Some evidence is also available for
other types of markets, such as the gold market (Cutler et al. 1991) and the option
market (Poteshman 2001).
A few studies have examined whether such anomalies give rise to profit opportu-
nities. In particular, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) developed a trading strategy based
on an algorithm consisting in undertaking transactions in the opposite direction to the
previous movement at a monthly frequency. They found that such a strategy generates
a 12% profit per year. A similar strategy, but at a weekly frequency, was developed by
Lehmann (1990), and was found to be equally profitable.
3 Data and Methodology
We analyse the following daily series: for the US stock market, the Dow Jones index
and stocks of two companies included in this index (Microsoft and Boeing—for the
trading robot analysis we also add Wal Mart and Exxon); for the FOREX, EURUSD,
USDJPYandGBCHF (for the trading robot analysis alsoAUDUSD); for commodities,
Gold and Oil. The sample period covers the period from January 2002 till the end of
September 2014 (for the trading robot analysis the period is 2012–2014).
3.1 Statistical Tests
First we carry out Student’s t tests to confirm (reject) the presence of anomalies after
overreactions. To provide additional evidences in favor of the tested hypotheses we
use ANOVA analysis. Also, to overcome normal distribution limitations we carry out
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Kruskall–Wallis tests. Then we apply the trading robot approach to establish whether
detected anomalies create exploitable profit opportunities. According to the classical
overreaction hypothesis, an overreaction should be followed by a correction, i.e. price
counter-movements, and bigger than after normal days. If one day is not enough for the
market to incorporate new information, i.e. to overreact, then after one-day abnormal
price changes one can expect movements in the direction of the overreaction bigger
than after normal days.
Therefore the following two hypotheses will be tested:
H1 Counter-reactions after overreactions differ from those after normal days.
Day of overreaction
(case of prices increase)
The next day
(prices tend to decrease in order
to restore the balance and get
back to the equilibrium price)
H2 Price movements after overreactions in the direction of the overreaction differ
from such movements after normal days.
Day of overreaction 
(case of prices increase)
The next day 
(prices tend to increase in order
to fully incorporate new 
information or to finish the 
process of overreacting)
The null hypothesis is in both cases that the data after normal and overreaction days
belong to the same population.
We analyse short-term overreactions, so the period of analysis is 1 day (one trading
session). The parameters characterising price behaviour over such a time interval are
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maximum, minimum, open and close prices. In most studies price movements are
measured as the difference between the open and close price. For the purposes of the
current study the daily return is measured as the difference between the maximum and
minimum prices during the day. It is more appropriate, because we are interested in
extreme points of the daily fluctuations. The use of maximum–minimum instead of
open-close allows us to analyse the full amplitude of the daily price changes. This is
calculated as:
Ri = (Highi − Lowi )
Lowi
× 100%, (1)
where Ri is the%daily return, Highi is themaximumprice, and Lowi is theminimum
price for day i .
We consider the following definition of “overreaction”:
Ri > (R¯n + k × δn), (2)
where k-the number of standard deviations used to identify overreaction,
R¯n is the average size of daily returns for period n
R¯n =
n∑
i=1
Ri/n (3)
and δn is the standard deviation of daily returns for period n
δn =
√√√√1
n
n∑
i=1
(Ri − R¯)2. (4)
The next step is to determine the size of the pricemovement during the next day. For
Hypothesis 1 (the counter-reaction or counter-movement assumption), we measure it
as the difference between the next day’s open price and the maximum deviation from
it in the opposite direction to the price movement in the overreaction day.
If the price increased, then the size of the counter-reaction is calculated as:
cRi+1 = 100% × (Openi+1 − Lowi+1)
Lowi+1
, (5)
where cRi+1 is the counter-reaction size, and Openi+l is the next day’s open price.
If the price decreased, then the corresponding definition is:
cRi+1 = 100% × (Highi+1 − Openi+1)
Openi+1
. (6)
In the case of Hypothesis 2 (movement in the direction of the overreaction), either
Eqs. (6) or (5) is used depending on whether the price has increased or decreased.
Two data sets (with cRi+1 values) are then constructed, including the size of price
movements after normal and abnormal price changes respectively. The first data set
consists of cRi+1 values after 1-day abnormal price changes. The second contains
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cRi+1 values after a day with normal price changes. The null hypothesis to be tested
is that they are both drawn from the same population.
3.2 Trading Robot Analysis
The trading robot approach considers the short-term overreactions from a trader’s
viewpoint, i.e. whether it is possible to make abnormal profits by exploiting the over-
reaction anomaly. The trading robot simulates the actions of a trader according to an
algorithm (trading strategy). This is a programme in the MetaTrader terminal that has
been developed in MetaQuotes Language 4 (MQL4) and used for the automation of
analytical and trading processes. Trading robots (called experts in MetaTrader) allow
to analyse price data and manage trading activities on the basis of the signals received.
We examine two trading strategies:
– Strategy 1 (based on H1) This is based on the classical short-term overreaction
anomaly, i.e. the presence the abnormal counter-reactions the day after the overre-
action day. The algorithm is constructed as follows: at the end of the overreaction
day financial assets are sold or bought depending on whether abnormal price
increases or decreased respectively have occurred. An open position is closed if a
target profit value is reached or at the end of the following day (for details of how
the target profit value is defined see below).
– Strategy 2 (based onH2)This is based on the non-classical short-term overreaction
anomaly, i.e. the presence the abnormal price movements in the direction of the
overreaction the following day. The algorithm is built as follows: at the end of
the overreaction day financial assets are bought or sold depending on whether
abnormal price increases or decreases respectively have occurred. Again, an open
position is closed if a target profit value is reached or at the end of the following day.
In order to avoid data-snooping bias and artificial fitting of certain parameters1 we
adopt the following testing procedure.
1. We use a base period (data from 2013) to obtain the optimal parameters for the
behaviour of asset prices (an example of such optimisation is reported in “Appendix
1”).
2. We test the trading strategy with the optimal parameters on the base period (2013
data) and two independent (non-optimised) periods (2012 and 2014) to seewhether
it is profitable (an example can be found in “Appendix 2”).
3. We perform continuous testing for the period 2012–2014 to obtain average results
for the trading strategy.
4. The results of continuous trading are used to assess the effectiveness of the strategy.
If total profits from trading are >0 and the number of profitable trades is >50%,
and the results are rather stable for different periods, then we conclude that there
is a market anomaly and it is exploitable.
To make sure that the results we obtain are statistically different from the random
ones we carry out t tests.We chose this approach instead of carrying out z tests because
1 By changing the values of various parameters of the trading strategy one can make it profitable, but this
would work only for the specific data set being used, not in general.
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Table 1 t Test for the trading
simulation results for the
Strategy 1 (case of EURUSD
testing period 2014)
Parameter Value
Number of the trades 12
Total profit −28.01
Average profit per trade −2.33
Standard deviation 27.92
t test −0.29
t critical (0.95) 1.78
Null hypothesis Accepted
the sample size is less than 100. A t test compares the means from two samples to
see whether they come from the same population. In our case the first is the average
profit/loss factor of one trade applying the trading strategy, and the second is equal to
zero because random trading (without transaction costs) should generate zero profit.
The null hypothesis (H0) is that the mean is the same in both samples, and the
alternative (H1) that it is not. The computed values of the t test are compared with the
critical one at the 5% significance level. Failure to reject H0 implies that there are no
advantages from exploiting the trading strategy being considered, whilst a rejection
suggests that the adopted strategy can generate abnormal profits.
Example of the t test results are reported in Table 1.
As it can be seen, H0 is confirmed, which implies that the trading simulation results
are not statistically different from the random ones and therefore this trading strategy
is not effective and there is no exploitable profit opportunity.
The results of the trading strategy testing and some key data are presented in the
“Report” in “Appendix 2”. The most important indicators given in the “Report” are:
– Total net profit: this is the difference between “Gross profit” and “Gross loss” mea-
sured in US dollars. We used marginal trading with the leverage 1:100, therefore
it is necessary to invest $1000 to make the profit mentioned in the Trading Report.
The annual return is defined as Total net profit/100, so, for instance, an annual total
net profit of $100 represents a 10% annual return on the investment;
– Profit trades: % of successful trades in total trades;
– Expected payoff: themathematical expectation of awin. This parameter represents
the average profit/loss per trade. It is also the expected profitability/unprofitability
of the next trade;
– Total trades: total amount of trade positions;
– Bars in test: the number of past observations modelled in bars during testing.
The results are summarised in the “Graph” section of the “Report”: this repre-
sents the account balance and general account status considering open positions. The
“Report” also provides full information on all the simulated transactions and their
financial results. The following parameters affect the profitability of the trading strate-
gies (the next section explains how they are set):
– Criterion for overreaction (symbol: sigma_dz): the number of standard deviations
added to the mean to form the standard day interval;
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– Period of averaging (period_dz): the size of data set on which base mean and
standard deviation are counted;
– Time in position (time_val): how long (in hours) the opened position has to be
held;
– Expected profit per trade or Take Profit (profit_koef): the size of profit expected
to result from a trade, measured as:
Take Profit = profit_koef ∗ sigma_dz;
– Maximum amount of losses per trade or Stop Loss (stop): the size of losses the
trader is willing to incur in a trade, defined as follows:
Stop Loss = stop ∗ sigma_dz.
4 Empirical Results
The first step is to set the basic overreaction parameters/criterions by choosing the
number of standard deviations (sigma_dz) to be added to the average to form the
“standard” day interval for price fluctuations and the averaging period to calculate the
mean and the standard deviation(symbol: period_dz).
For this purpose we used the Dow Jones index data for the period 1987–2012. The
number of abnormal returns detected in the period 1987–2012 is reported in Table 2.
As can be seen, both parameters (averaging period and number of standard devi-
ations added to the mean) affect the number of detected anomalies. Changes in the
averaging period only have a small effect (the difference between the results when the
period considered is 5 and 30 respectively is less than 10%). By contrast, each addi-
tional standard deviation significantly decreases the number of observed abnormal
returns (by 50% for each additional sigma). Therefore 2–4% of the full sample (the
number of abnormal returns in the case of 3 sigmas) is not sufficiently representative
to draw conclusions. That is why we set the parameter sigma_dz equal to 1. Evidence
that this is true holds not only in case of the Dow Jones index data but also for the
other financial assets as is presented in Table 3.
Table 2 Number of abnormal returns detections in Dow-Jones index during 1987–2012
Period_dz 5 10 20 30
Indicator Number % Number % Number % Number %
Overall 6458 100 6454 100 6444 100 6434 100
Number of abnormal returns
(criterion=mean+ sigma_dz)
1297 20 1183 18 1123 17 1070 17
Number of abnormal returns
(criterion=mean+2*sigma_dz)
587 9 474 7 379 6 371 6
Number of abnormal returns
(criterion=mean+3*sigma_dz)
290 4 194 3 159 2 145 2
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Table 3 Number of abnormal returns detections in different financial assets (averaging period 20)
Financial asset Gold Oil EURUSD USDJPY Boeing Microsoft
% of abnormal returns (crite-
rion=mean+ sigma_dz)
16 16 17 15 17 15
% of abnormal returns (crite-
rion=mean+2*sigma_dz)
8 8 12 12 16 6
% of abnormal returns (crite-
rion=mean+3*sigma_dz)
2 3 4 4 6 3
Table 4 t test of the short-term counter-reactions after the day of the overreaction for the Dow-Jones index
during 1987–2012
Period_dz 5 10 20 30
Abnormal Normal Abnormal Normal Abnormal Normal Abnormal Normal
Number of
matches
1297 5161 1183 5271 1123 5321 1070 5364
Mean (%) 0.97 0.95 1.00 0.94 1.06 0.93 1.09 0.92
Standard
deviation (%)
0.97 0.80 1.01 0.80 1.08 0.78 1.12 0.77
t-Criterion 0.86 2.03 4.23 4.72
t-Critical
(P = 0.95)
1.96
Null hypothesis Accepted Rejected Rejected Rejected
To make sure that this choice is reasonable in practice we test the trading strategy
based on overreactions with a different set of parameters (see “Appendix 3”). The
results provide evidence in favour of 1 as an appropriate value for the sigma_dz
parameter. Student’s t tests of short-term counter-reactions carried out for the Dow
Jones index over the period 1987–2012 (see Table 4) suggest that the optimal averaging
periods are 20 and 30 (the corresponding t statistics are significantly higher than for
other averaging periods), and thus the t tests are also performed for these.
The results forH1are presented in “Appendices 6–8” and are summarized inTable 5.
In the case of the commodity markets H1 is rejected for Oil (that is, we obtain
evidence in favor of anomaly presence) but cannot be rejected for Gold for both
averaging periods. The results from testing Hypothesis 1 for the US stock markets are
stable for the two averaging periods (20 and 30) and confirm the presence of a statistical
anomaly in the price dynamics in the US stock market after short-term overreactions.
The results from testing Hypothesis 1 for the FOREX are not as stable as those for
the US stock market. No anomaly is detected for the EURUSD (for both periods of
averaging), whilst one is observed in the behaviour of GBPCHF (for both averaging
periods). The USDJPY results are sensitive to the choice of the averaging period (an
anomaly is found with an averaging period of 20, but not of 30).
Overall, it appears that in the case ofH1 the longer the averaging period is, the bigger
is the probability of anomaly detection. H1 cannot be rejected for the US stock market
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Table 5 Statistical tests results: case of Hypothesis 1
Financial market Commodities US stock market FOREX
Financial asset Gold Oil Dow-Jones
index
Microsoft Boeing
company
EURUSD USDJPY GBPCHF
Averaging period (period_dz)=20
t test + − − − − + + −
ANOVA + + − − − + + −
Kruskal–Wallis test − + + − − + + −
Averaging period (period_dz)=30
t test + − − − − + − −
ANOVA + − − − − + − −
Kruskal–Wallis test + − − − − + − −
“+”—null hypothesis confirmed, “−”—null hypothesis rejected
Table 6 Statistical tests results: case of Hypothesis 2
Financial market Commodities US stock market FOREX
Financial asset Gold Oil Dow-Jones
index
Microsoft Boeing
company
EURUSD USDJPY GBPCHF
Averaging period (period_dz)=20
t test + + + − − − − −
ANOVA − − + − − − − −
Kruskal–Wallis test + − + + + + − +
Averaging period (period_dz)=30
t test − − − − − − − −
ANOVA − − − − − − − −
Kruskal–Wallis test − + + − − − − +
“+”—null hypothesis confirmed, “−”—null hypothesis rejected
(in all cases) and in some cases for the FOREX (USDJPYandGBPCHF) and commod-
ity (Oil) markets when the averaging period is 30. Therefore the classical short-term
counter-movement after an overreaction day is confirmed in many cases, especially
with an averaging period_dz=30. The only exceptions are Gold and EURUSD.
The results for H2 are presented in “Appendices 9–11” and are summarized in
Table 6.
Hypothesis 2 can be rejected in most cases for the commodity markets (the only
exception is Gold with an averaging period of 20). The results from testing Hypothesis
2 for the US stockmarkets are more stable for the two averaging period 30 and confirm
the presence of a statistical anomaly in the price dynamics in the US stock market after
short-term overreactions. The same conclusion is reached for the FOREX market. In
general the results for H2 are much more consistent (with an averaging period of 30)
than the ones for H1: they provide strong evidence of an “inertia anomaly” in all
markets considered after the overreaction day.
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Next, we analyse whether these anomalies give rise to exploitable profit opportuni-
ties. If they do not, we conclude that they do not represent evidence inconsistent with
the EMH. The parameters of the trading strategies 1 and 2 are set as follows:
1. Constants
– Period_dz=30 (explanations to this see above);
– Time_val=22 (this amounts to closing a deal after a day being in position);
– Sigma_dz=1 (see above).
2. Changeable (it needs to be optimised during testing)
– Profit_koef;
– Stop.
The results of the parameter optimisation and of the trading robot analysis are
presented in “Appendix 4” (Strategy 1) and 5 (Strategy 2). They imply that it is not
possible to make extra profits by adopting Strategy 1 (based on Hypothesis 1) in most
of the cases. Exploitable profit opportunities in the case of the US stock market and
the commodity markets are unstable and might reflect data-snooping bias in 2013 (the
only exception are the very stable Wal Mart results). In general Strategy 1 (which is
based on the assumption that after an overreaction day counter-movements are bigger
than after a standard day) does not yield stable profitable results and therefore this
anomaly cannot be seen as inconsistent with the EMH. Strategy 2, which is based
instead on the “inertia anomaly”, appears to be more successful: it generates positive
profits in the case of the Commodities (Gold and Oil) and FOREX (EURUSD and
USDJPY)markets, not only in 2013, but also in other time periods. Still only EURUSD
and Gold have passed t test for difference from the random data.
5 Conclusions
This paper examines short-term price overreactions in various financial markets (com-
modities, US stock market and FOREX). It aims to establish whether these are simply
statistical phenomena (i.e., price dynamics after overreaction days differ statistically
from those after normal days) or also represent an anomaly inconsistent with the EMH
(i.e., it is possible to make extra profits exploiting them). For this purpose, first we
have performed statistical tests (parametric and non-parametric) to confirm/reject the
presence of overreactions as a statistical phenomenon. Then we use a trading robot
approach to simulate the behaviour of traders and test the profitability of two alterna-
tive strategies, one based on the classical overreaction anomaly (H1: counter-reactions
after overreactions differ from those after normal days), the other on a newly defined
“inertia anomaly” (H2: price movements after overreactions in the same direction of
the overreaction differ from those after normal days).
The findings can be summarised as follows. H1 cannot be rejected for the US stock
market and in some cases for the FOREX (USDJPY and GBPCHF) and commodity
(Oil) markets when the averaging period is 30. The results for the H2 are even more
consistent and provide strong evidence of an “inertia anomaly” in all markets consid-
ered after the overreaction day. The trading robot analysis shows that Strategy 1, which
is based on the assumption that after the overreaction day counter-movements are big-
ger than after a standard day, is not generally profitable and therefore this anomaly
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cannot be seen as inconsistent with the EMH. By contrast, Strategy 2, based on the
“inertia anomaly”, appears to be more successful and generates stable profits in the
case of the Gold and EURUSD.
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Appendix 1
Example of optimisation results: case of EURUSD, period 2013, H1 testing (Fig. 1;
Table 7).
Fig. 1 Distribution of results (X—profit_koef, Y—stop)—deeper green means better results
Table 7 Results of testing: case of EURUSD, period 2013 (changeable parameters profit_koef from 0.5 to
3 with step 0.5; stop from 1 to 5 with step 1), start deposit=10,000$, size of trading lot=10,000$, margin
(credit) leverage=100, time_val =22, period_dz=30, sigma_koef=1
Number of
simulation
Profit, $ Total
trades
Profit
factor
Expected
payoff
Drawdown, $ Drawdown (%) Profit_koef Stop
1 −34.61 31 0.91 −1.12 183.27 17.88 0.5 1
7 −67.61 28 0.84 −2.41 170.27 16.90 0.5 2
13 −88.61 28 0.81 −3.16 184.27 17.92 0.5 3
19 −168.61 28 0.69 −6.02 237.71 23.67 0.5 4
25 −229.61 28 0.62 −8.20 296.46 29.59 0.5 5
9 −309.61 28 0.60 −11.06 330.47 32.98 1.5 2
12 −314.61 28 0.60 −11.24 339.05 33.84 3 2
8 −329.61 28 0.56 −11.77 413.88 41.31 1 2
15 −330.61 28 0.60 −11.81 351.47 35.08 1.5 3
2 −330.61 30 0.48 −11.02 414.88 41.41 1 1
11 −333.61 28 0.58 −11.91 354.47 35.38 2.5 2
18 −335.61 28 0.60 −11.99 356.47 35.58 3 3
10 −341.61 28 0.57 −12.20 362.47 36.17 2 2
21 −348.61 28 0.59 −12.45 369.47 36.87 1.5 4
14 −350.61 28 0.56 −12.52 434.88 43.40 1 3
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Table 7 continued
Number of
simulation
Profit, $ Total
trades
Profit
factor
Expected
payoff
Drawdown, $ Drawdown (%) Profit_koef Stop
24 −353.61 28 0.59 −12.63 380.15 37.94 3 4
17 −354.61 28 0.58 −12.66 375.47 37.47 2.5 3
16 −362.61 28 0.57 −12.95 383.47 38.27 2 3
20 −368.61 28 0.55 −13.16 454.46 45.36 1 4
6 −369.61 30 0.46 −12.32 431.46 43.06 3 1
23 −372.61 28 0.56 −13.31 393.47 39.27 2.5 4
22 −380.61 28 0.55 −13.59 401.47 40.07 2 4
4 −395.61 30 0.42 −13.19 425.46 42.46 2 1
5 −405.61 30 0.41 −13.52 451.46 45.06 2.5 1
3 −405.61 30 0.41 −13.52 426.47 42.56 1.5 1
27 −409.61 28 0.55 −14.63 430.47 42.96 1.5 5
30 −414.61 28 0.55 −14.81 441.15 44.03 3 5
26 −429.61 28 0.51 −15.34 515.46 51.44 1 5
29 −433.61 28 0.53 −15.49 454.47 45.36 2.5 5
28 −441.61 28 0.52 −15.77 462.47 46.15 2 5
Appendix 2
Example of strategy tester report: case of EURUSD, period 2014, H1 testing (Fig. 2;
Tables 8, 9).
Fig. 2 Equity dynamics
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Table 9 Statement
# Time Type Order Size Price S/L T/P Profit Balance
1 02.01.2014 23:45 Buy 1 0.10 1.3662 1.3584 1.3681
2 03.01.2014 21:45 Close 1 0.10 1.3586 1.3584 1.3681 −76.14 1.3586
3 23.01.2014 23:00 Sell 2 0.10 1.3696 1.3770 1.3677
4 24.01.2014 9:51 t/p 2 0.10 1.3677 1.3770 1.3677 18.83 1.3677
5 28.02.2014 23:00 Sell 3 0.10 1.3802 1.3863 1.3787
6 03.03.2014 0:00 Close 3 0.10 1.3788 1.3863 1.3787 13.83 1.3788
7 06.03.2014 23:00 Sell 4 0.10 1.3861 1.3924 1.3845
8 07.03.2014 21:00 Close 4 0.10 1.3871 1.3924 1.3845 −10.17 1.3871
9 19.03.2014 23:00 Buy 5 0.10 1.3820 1.3759 1.3835
10 20.03.2014 4:14 t/p 5 0.10 1.3835 1.3759 1.3835 14.58 1.3835
11 30.04.2014 23:00 Sell 6 0.10 1.3867 1.3918 1.3854
12 01.05.2014 21:00 Close 6 0.10 1.3867 1.3918 1.3854 −0.51 1.3867
13 08.05.2014 23:00 Buy 7 0.10 1.3841 1.3796 1.3852
14 09.05.2014 13:01 s/l 7 0.10 1.3796 1.3796 1.3852 −45.14 1.3796
15 05.06.2014 23:00 Sell 8 0.10 1.3660 1.3719 1.3645
16 06.06.2014 10:11 t/p 8 0.10 1.3645 1.3719 1.3645 14.83 1.3645
17 22.07.2014 23:00 Buy 9 0.10 1.3466 1.3438 1.3473
18 23.07.2014 10:34 t/p 9 0.10 1.3473 1.3438 1.3473 6.86 1.3473
19 20.08.2014 23:00 Buy 10 0.10 1.3260 1.3226 1.3269
20 21.08.2014 9:30 t/p 10 0.10 1.3269 1.3226 1.3269 8.58 1.3269
21 04.09.2014 23:00 Buy 11 0.10 1.2947 1.2913 1.2956
22 05.09.2014 11:03 t/p 11 0.10 1.2956 1.2913 1.2956 8.86 1.2956
23 17.09.2014 23:00 Buy 12 0.10 1.2874 1.2802 1.2892
24 18.09.2014 11:51 t/p 12 0.10 1.2892 1.2802 1.2892 17.58 1.2892
Appendix 3
Testing results for the EURUSD, period 2012–2014 (Figs. 3, 4, 5).
Fig. 3 Testing results for the EURUSD, period 2012–2014 (X—sigma_dz, Y—time_val). The more prof-
itable the trading strategy is the darker the bars
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Fig. 4 Testing results for the EURUSD, period 2012–2014 (X—sigma_dz, Y—profit_koef. The more
profitable the trading strategy is the darker the bars
Fig. 5 Testing results for the EURUSD, period 2012–2014 (X—sigma_dz, Y—period_dz). The more
profitable the trading strategy is the darker the bars
Appendix 4
Trading results for Strategy 1 (Table 10).
Table 10 Trading results for Strategy 1
Parameters 2012 2013
Profit_
koef
Stop % successful Profit,
USD
Annual
return
(%)
t test % successful Profit,
USD
Annual
return
(%)
t test
FOREX
EURUSD 0.5 2 64.0 −21 −2 Accepted 71.0 −67 −7 Accepted
USDJPY 0.5 5 70.0 −1 0 Accepted 82.0 225 23 Accepted
GBPCHF 1 4 71.0 −3 0 Accepted 60.0 −120 −12 Accepted
AUDUSD 3 1 23.8 −187 −19 Accepted 44.0 288 29 Accepted
US stock market
Microsoft 1 2 63.0 −3 0 Accepted 63.0 8 1 Accepted
Boeing 0.5 3 74.0 −13 −1 Accepted 84.0 56 6 Rejected
Exxon 1 5 56.0 −30 −3 Accepted 73.0 30 3 Accepted
Wal mart 2.5 1 37.0 5 1 Accepted 58.0 50 5 Rejected
Commodities
Gold 3 5 43.0 −252 −25 Accepted 58.0 912 91 Accepted
Oil* 1.5 5 57 −75 −8 Accepted 39 −535 −54 Accepted
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Table 10 continued
2014 2012–2014
% success-
ful
Profit,
USD
Annual
return (%)
t test % success-
ful
Profit,
USD
Average
annual
return (%)
t test
FOREX
EURUSD 67.0 −28 −3 Accepted 68.0 −116 −4 Accepted
USDJPY 69.0 −39 −4 Accepted 75.0 183 6 Accepted
GBPCHF 47.0 −207 −21 Accepted 61.0 −330 −11 Accepted
AUDUSD 30.0 −120 −12 Accepted 32.0 24 1 Accepted
US stock market
Microsoft 55.0 −6 −1 Accepted 61.0 0 0 Accepted
Boeing 80.0 0 0 Accepted 80.0 44 1 Accepted
Exxon 71.0 21 2 Accepted 66.0 23 1 Accepted
Wal mart 50.0 27 3 Accepted 47.0 82 3 Rejected
Commodities
Gold 33.0 −138 −14 Accepted 51.0 618 21 Accepted
Oil* 38 −423 −42 Accepted 41 −1033 −34 Accepted
* For OIL data because of data availability periods 2013–2015 were used
Bold is used to highlight different results
Appendix 5
Trading results for Strategy 2 (Table 11).
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Appendix 6
Statistical tests of Hypothesis 1—case of commodity markets (Tables 12, 13, 14).
Table 12 t Test of Hypothesis 1—case of commodity markets
Period of averaging
(period_dz)
20 30
Type of asset Gold Oil Gold Oil
Indicator Abnormal Normal Abnormal Normal Abnormal Normal Abnormal Normal
Number of matches 536 2637 517 2656 538 2763 496 2667
Mean (%) 0.84 0.80 1.67 1.39 0.83 0.79 1.73 1.38
Standard deviation (%) 0.73 0.77 1.56 1.31 0.75 0.76 1.56 1.31
t-Criterion 1.4 4.03 1.16 4.97
t-Critical (P = 0.95) 1.96
Null hypothesis Accepted Rejected Accepted Rejected
Table 13 ANOVA test of Hypothesis 1—case of commodity markets
Period of averaging (period_dz) 20 30
Type of asset Gold Oil Gold Oil
F 1.49 2.21 1.09 27.73
P value 0.22 0.13 0.29 0.00
F critical 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84
Null hypothesis Accepted Accepted Accepted Rejected
Table 14 Kruskal–Wallis test of Hypothesis 1—case of commodity markets
Period of averaging (period_dz) 20 30
Type of asset Gold Oil Gold Oil
Adjusted H 5.35 1.97 2.63 26.71
df 1 1 1 1
P value 0.02 0.16 0.10 0.00
Critical value 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84
Null hypothesis Rejected Accepted Accepted Rejected
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Appendix 7
Statistical tests of Hypothesis 1—case of US stock market (Tables 15, 16, 17, 18).
Table 15 t Test of Hypothesis 1 for averaging period (period_dz)=20, case of US stock market
Type of asset Dow-Jones index Microsoft Boeing company
Indicator Abnormal Normal Abnormal Normal Abnormal Normal
Number of matches 563 2610 341 1884 400 1997
Mean (%) 0.82 0.72 1.22 0.94 1.23 1.03
Standard deviation (%) 1.00 0.82 1.32 1.02 1.25 1.05
t-Criterion 2.49 3.92 3.18
t-Critical (P = 0.95) 1.96
Null hypothesis Rejected Rejected Rejected
Table 16 t Test of Hypothesis 1 for averaging period (period_dz)=30, case of US stock market
Type of asset Dow-Jones index Microsoft Boeing company
Indicator Abnormal Normal Abnormal Normal Abnormal Normal
Number of matches 535 2628 324 1890 371 2015
Mean (%) 0.87 0.71 1.20 0.95 0.58 0.49
Standard deviation (%) 1.06 0.80 1.32 1.02 0.59 0.55
t-Criterion 3.47 3.44 2.95
t-Critical (P = 0.95) 1.96
Null hypothesis Rejected Rejected Rejected
Table 17 ANOVA test of Hypothesis 1—case of US stock market
Period of averaging (period_dz) 20 30
Type of asset Dow-Jones
index
Microsoft Boeing
company
Dow-Jones
index
Microsoft Boeing
company
F 7.03 19.82 11.13 15.60 15.21 8.19
P value 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F critical 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84
Null hypothesis Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected
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Table 18 Kruskal–Wallis test of Hypothesis 1—case of US stock market
Period of averaging
(period_dz)
20 30
Type of asset Dow-Jones
index
Microsoft Boeing
company
Dow-Jones
index
Microsoft Boeing
company
Adjusted H 3.37 16.04 10.71 5.38 13.17 7.65
df 1 1 1 1 1 1
P value 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01
Critical value 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84
Null hypothesis Accepted Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected
Appendix 8
Statistical tests of Hypothesis 1—case of foreign exchange market (Tables 19, 20,
21, 22).
Table 19 t Test of Hypothesis 1 for averaging period (period_dz)=20, case of foreign exchange market
Type of asset EURUSD USDJPY GBPCHF
Indicator Abnormal Normal Abnormal Normal Abnormal Normal
Number of matches 534 2639 495 2793 540 2748
Mean (%) 0.45 0.48 0.52 0.48 0.48 0.44
Standard deviation (%) 0.39 0.41 0.48 0.45 0.45 0.46
t-Criterion −2.07 1.8 2.39
t-Critical (P = 0.95) 1.96
Null hypothesis Accepted Accepted Rejected
Table 20 t Test of Hypothesis 1 for averaging period (period_dz)=30, case of foreign exchange market
Type of asset EURUSD USDJPY GBPCHF
Indicator Abnormal Normal Abnormal Normal Abnormal Normal
Number of matches 529 2734 477 2786 513 2765
Mean (%) 0.46 0.48 0.52 0.47 0.49 0.44
Standard deviation (%) 0.40 0.41 0.48 0.45 0.47 0.46
t-Criterion −0.99 2.44 2.57
t-Critical (P = 0.95) 1.96
Null hypothesis Accepted Rejected Rejected
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Table 21 ANOVA test of Hypothesis 1—case of foreign exchange market
Period of averaging (period_dz) 20 30
Type of asset EURUSD USDJPY GBPCHF EURUSD USDJPY GBPCHF
F 0.08 3.00 4.70 0.80 5.84 5.75
P value 0.77 0.08 0.03 0.37 0.02 0.02
F critical 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84
Null hypothesis Accepted Accepted Rejected Accepted Rejected Rejected
Table 22 Kruskal–Wallis test of Hypothesis 1—case of foreign exchange market
Period of averaging (period_dz) 20 30
Type of asset EURUSD USDJPY GBPCHF EURUSD USDJPY GBPCHF
Adjusted H 0.03 2.63 5.09 0.92 4.47 6.02
df 1 1 1 1 1 1
P value 0.87 0.10 0.02 0.34 0.03 0.01
Critical value 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84
Null hypothesis Accepted Accepted Rejected Accepted Rejected Rejected
Appendix 9
Statistical tests of Hypothesis 2—case of commodity markets (Tables 23, 24, 25).
Table 23 t Test of Hypothesis 2—case of commodity markets
Period of averaging
(period_dz)
20 30
Type of asset Gold Oil Gold Oil
Indicator Abnormal Normal Abnormal Normal Abnormal Normal Abnormal Normal
Number of matches 536 2637 517 2656 538 2763 496 2667
Mean (%) 0.87 0.79 1.57 1.42 0.89 0.78 1.60 1.41
Standard deviation (%) 0.94 0.78 1.52 1.40 0.95 0.77 1.57 1.39
t-Criterion 1.88 2.3 2.81 2.67
t-Critical (P = 0.95) 1.96
Null hypothesis Accepted Rejected Rejected Rejected
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Table 24 ANOVA test of Hypothesis 2—case of commodity markets
Period of averaging (period_dz) 20 30
Type of asset Gold Oil Gold Oil
F 3.93 5.09 9.19 7.41
P value 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.00
F critical 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84
Null hypothesis Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected
Table 25 Kruskal–Wallis test of Hypothesis 2—case of commodity markets
Period of averaging (period_dz) 20 30
Type of asset Gold Oil Gold Oil
Adjusted H 2.54 3.88 6.72 3.82
df 1 1 1 1
P value 0.11 0.05 0.01 0.05
Critical value 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84
Null hypothesis Accepted Rejected Rejected Accepted
Appendix 10
Statistical tests of Hypothesis 2—case of US stock market (Tables 26, 27, 28, 29).
Table 26 t Test of Hypothesis 2 for averaging period (period_dz)=20, case of US stock market
Type of asset Dow-Jones index Microsoft Boeing company
Indicator Abnormal Normal Abnormal Normal Abnormal Normal
Number of matches 563 2610 341 1884 400 1997
Mean (%) 0.69 0.65 1.19 0.98 1.29 1.07
Standard deviation (%) 0.89 0.83 1.27 0.94 1.42 1.12
t-Criterion 1.13 3.04 3.12
t-Critical (P = 0.95) 1.96
Null hypothesis Accepted Rejected Rejected
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Table 27 t Test of Hypothesis 2 for averaging period (period_dz)=30, case of US stock market
Type of asset Dow-Jones index Microsoft Boeing company
Indicator Abnormal Normal Abnormal Normal Abnormal Normal
Number of matches 535 2628 324 1890 370 2016
Mean (%) 0.75 0.65 1.27 1.00 1.95 1.61
Standard deviation (%) 1.05 0.82 1.34 0.96 1.50 1.16
t-Criterion 2.33 3.62 4.36
t-Critical (P = 0.95) 1.96
Null hypothesis Rejected Rejected Rejected
Table 28 ANOVA test of Hypothesis 2—case of US stock market
Period of averaging (period_dz) 20 30
Type of asset Dow-Jones
index
Microsoft Boeing
company
Dow-Jones
index
Microsoft Boeing
company
F 1.17 12.63 11.81 6.65 18.92 24.27
P value 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
F critical 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84
Null hypothesis Accepted Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected
Table 29 Kruskal–Wallis test of Hypothesis 2—case of US stock market
Period of averaging (period_dz) 20 30
Type of asset Dow-Jones
index
Microsoft Boeing
company
Dow-Jones
index
Microsoft Boeing
company
Adjusted H 1.37 3.36 3.47 2.7 8.61 18.23
df 1 1 1 1 1 1
P value 0.24 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.00 0.00
Critical value 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84
Null hypothesis Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted Rejected Rejected
Appendix 11
Statistical tests of Hypothesis 2—case of foreign exchange market (Tables 30, 31, 32,
33).
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Table 30 t Test of Hypothesis 2 for averaging period (period_dz)=20, case of foreign exchange market
Type of asset EURUSD USDJPY GBPCHF
Indicator Abnormal Normal Abnormal Normal Abnormal Normal
Number of matches 534 2639 495 2793 540 2748
Mean (%) 0.51 0.45 0.54 0.48 0.48 0.43
Standard deviation (%) 0.49 0.41 0.60 0.49 0.57 0.41
t-Criterion 2.82 2.17 2.24
t-Critical (P = 0.95) 1.96
Null hypothesis Rejected Rejected Rejected
Table 31 t Test of Hypothesis 2 for averaging period (period_dz)=30, case of foreign exchange market
Type of asset EURUSD USDJPY GBPCHF
Indicator Abnormal Normal Abnormal Normal Abnormal Normal
Number of matches 529 2734 477 2786 513 2765
Mean (%) 0.50 0.44 0.53 0.47 0.49 0.43
Standard deviation (%) 0.47 0.41 0.60 0.48 0.60 0.40
t-Criterion 2.82 2.3 2.3
t-Critical (P = 0.95) 1.96
Null hypothesis Rejected Rejected Rejected
Table 32 ANOVA test of Hypothesis 2—case of foreign exchange market
Period of averaging (period_dz) 20 30
Type of asset EURUSD USDJPY GBPCHF EURUSD USDJPY GBPCHF
F 8.66 5.57 7.20 8.20 6.45 8.23
P value 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
F critical 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84
Null hypothesis Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected Rejected
Table 33 Kruskal–Wallis test of Hypothesis 2—case of foreign exchange market
Period of averaging (period_dz) 20 30
Type of asset EURUSD USDJPY GBPCHF EURUSD USDJPY GBPCHF
Adjusted H 3.73 4.2 2.04 5.53 4.18 1.18
df 1 1 1 1 1 1
P value 0.05 0.04 0.15 0.02 0.04 0.28
Critical value 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84 3.84
Null hypothesis Accepted Rejected Accepted Rejected Rejected Accepted
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